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INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION FLOW:
THE DEVELOPING WORLD PERSPECTIVE
Jane Bortnickt
Discussions of international data flows have traditionally
centered upon the industrialized nations, while often ignoring the
less developed countries (LDCs, developing nations, or Third
World).' Nevertheless, like the industrialized nations, the LDCs are
major stakeholders in the debate on the international flow of
information. The success of their drive for economic, social, and
political development in a highly technological world is dependent
increasingly upon their ability to acquire and effectively employ data
processing and telecommunications technologies.2 In an attempt to
harness these technologies, a growing number of LDCs have
adopted national informatics plans and policies.3 These measures
reflect the desire of the LDCs to gain access to economic and
technical information that can aid the development process without
creating a new type of dependence upon the developed world. In
part, these actions create barriers to the international flow of
information that may cause substantial injury to private enterprises
attempting to enter and compete in LDC markets.4
t Specialist in Information Science and Technology, Congressional Research
Service, Library of Congress.
The views expressed herein are solely those of the author, and do not necessarily
reflect those of the Congressional Research Service or the Library of Congress.
1. The Third World is not a homogeneous entity. Rather, the nations grouped
under that rubric reflect varying levels of development as well as divergent goals and
resources. Significant differences in political philosophy, economic advancement, and
cultural heritage exist among the various LDCs. At the same time, the LDCs are unified
by a shared desire to steadily improve their standard of living, to build stable national
economies, and to compete in the international marketplace while preserving their
unique cultural identities.
2. The acquisition and successful employment of modern communications and
information technologies, as well as access to scientific and technical information, are
essential to development. For a discussion of how informatics technology promotes the
economic, social, and political development of the LDCs, see notes 7-11 infra and
accompanying text.
3. House COMM. ON GovERNMENT OPERATIONS, INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION
FLOW: FORGING A NEw FRAMEWORK, H.R. REP. No. 1535, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 31
(1980) [hereinafter cited as House REPORT].
4. Id at 23-27, 31.
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Furthermore, the LDCs have been increasingly vocal in
expressing their information needs and concerns in numerous
international fora.5 Several international organizations have begun
to focus on the need to harmonize the information needs and
concerns of the developed and developing nations. 6 It is difficult
to ascertain at this time the full impact of the LDCs on international
debates concerning information and communications policies.
However, there is growing evidence that they may significantly affect
the establishment of international agreements in the area of
informatics.
This Article studies the actions of the LDCs: those taken
unilaterally by the individual countries and multilaterally as
members of international organizations. Section I discusses the
problems that prevent LDCs from acquiring sophisticated
information technologies. Section II discusses the developing
nations' national informatics plans, analyzing the reasons for their
adoption and the effects they have on multinational private
enterprises. Section II includes a special case study of the Brazil
national inforinatics policy. Finally, Section III discusses the
international organizations that have taken measures to aid the
LDCs in the development of their information and communications
technologies and in which the developing countries are taking an
active role.
I
INFORMATION PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES
OF THE THIRD WORLD
The success of the LDCs' quest for economic, social, and polit-
ical development depends significantly upon their ability to develop
and employ technologies related to informatics. "Informatics is the
rational and systematic application of information to economic,
social, and political development."7 Informatics fosters economic
development by facilitating both the acquisition and the use of scien-
tific and technical data." For example, access to remote databases,
combined with the ability to gather and analyze domestic resource
5. See generally AMERICAN FEDERATION OF INFORMATION PROCESSING SOCIETIES,
TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS: CONCERNS IN PRIVACY PROTECTION AND FREE FLOW OF
INFORMATION 28 (R. Turn ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as FREE FLOW]; Hamelink,
Informatics: Third World Call/or New Order, 29 . CoM. 144 (1979).
6. HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 27-30.
7. INTERGOVERNMENTAL BUREAU FOP INFORMATICS, INFORMATICS: ITS POLIT-
ICAL IMPACT 2 (Jan. 1978) [hereinafter cited as POLITICAL IMPACT].
8. For a discussion of how informatics fosters the economic development of the
LDCs, see generally POLITICAL IMPACT, su.pra note 7, at 8; Hamelink, supra note 5, at
144-46.
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information, can enhance decisionmaking in support of national
development. The LDCs, without engaging in extensive research of
their own, can use this information as the basis for formulating their
own technological and economic development programs. Informat-
ics also facilitates processing of large amounts of data used to plan
and control the implementation of these programs.9 Informatics,
likewise, fosters social development by educating people, by shaping
and preserving cultural values, and by promoting social change.' 0
Finally, informatics fosters political development by providing more
input into the political decisionmaking process and by facilitating
the planning and control of government plans and policies."
The LDCs approach informatics problems from the perspective
of information and technology "have-nots." Their concerns revolve
around their lack of access to both technology and the world's store
of knowledge. Lack of access not only means that LDCs have been
unable to procure technical information from the outside world; it
also means that once they obtain this information, they have been
unable to fully utilize it.
The developing countries lack effective informatics systems for
several reasons. 12 First, they lack a technolgocial infrastructure that
provides an environment for indigenous research, development, and
local innovation. The absence of a technological infrastructure is a
severe handicap to the effective integration of modem communica-
tions and data processing systems into the unique environment of
each developing nation. Of equal importance, the developing coun-
tries lack an information infrastructure.' 3 An information infra-
structure consists of the "complex of institutions, organizations,
resources, and systems and services which support the flow and
delivery of information from the generator to the users."' 4 It pro-
vides a variety of information-handling services, institutions for
acquiring, packaging, and distributing materials, government entities
9. POLITICAL IMPACT, supra note 7, at 8.
10. For a discussion of how informatics fosters the social and cultural development
of the LDCs, see generally id at 8-9.
11. For a discussion of how informatics fosters the political development of the
LDCs, see generally id at 9-17.
12. For a discussion of the LDCs' inability to develop effective informatics systems,
see generally L. Agrawal, Problems and Limitations in Installation of Transborder Data
Flow System in Developing Nations (June 1980) (unpublished paper presented at Inter-
governmental Bureau for Informatics World Conference on Transborder Data Flow Pol-
icies); United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization,
Intergovernmental Conference on Scientific and Technological Information for Develop-
ment: UNSIST II, U.N. Doc. PGI-79/CONF. 201/COL. 5 (18 April 1979) (Main Work-
ing Document of 1979 UNESCO Conference) [hereinafter cited as UNESCO Main
Working Document].
13. UNESCO Main Working Document, supra note 12, at xi.
14. Id
1981]
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for articulating national information policies, modem communica-
tions and data processing equipment and services for facilitating
information transfer, and a cadre of well trained and educated infor-
mation professionals and information users. Computer technology
is an ever-changing and developing field. Constant advancements
require the ability to keep pace with ongoing technological develop-
ment. The LDCs lack sufficient trained personnel to engage in
research, and to install, maintain, and program indigenous computer
systems.15
The other major difficulty facing the LDCs is their lack of avail-
able capital for investment in high technology products and serv-
ices.16 While hardware costs will presumably continue to decline as
a result of electronic component miniaturization, software costs are
rising. Unfortunately, the LDCs simply do not have the local exper-
tise to produce their own software.' 7
The industrialized nations' attempts to help the LDCs develop
their information and communications technologies have been
piecemeal and often directed toward maintaining the status quo.
While the United States has generated a good deal of rhetoric con-
cerning the need to enhance information and communications devel-
opment in the Third World, it has actually committed a minimal
amount of funds.' 8 The emphasis of United States foreign assist-
ance, like that of many international organizations, is currently on
"basic needs," such as food and health services. Because informa-
tion and communications are not considered basic needs, they do not
command priority funding.
The United States has made some effort to increase the availa-
bility of scientific and technical information in the developing world.
Government and commercial vendors have made U.S. databases
available to LDCs,19 and numerous federal agencies have instituted
information dissemination and technical assistance programs for
developing countries.20 A lack of interest and inadequate coordina-
15. L. Agrawal, supra note 12, 1 2.1(e), 2.2(c).
16. Id 2.2(e).
17. Id 1 2.2(c).
18. Honig, Lessonsfor the 1999 WRC, 30 J. COM. 48, 55 (1980). For a history of
U.S proposals to provide financial assistance to the LDCs, see ACADEMY FOR EDUCA-
TIONAL DEVELOPMENT, THE UNITED STATES AND THE DEBATE ON THE WORLD "INFOR-
MATION ORDER" 5-6 (J. Gunter ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as NWIO Debate].
19. U.S. DEPARTMENT OE.S.TATE, THE INFORMATION RESOURCES AND SERVICES OF
THE UNITED STATES: AN INTRODUCTION FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (July 1979).
20. J. Bortnick, W. Schacht & L. Raleigh, The Role of the United States in Scientific
and Technical Information Assistance for the Developing Countries 72-123 (March 13,
1980) (Part II of U.S. POLICIES OF THE DEVELOPING NATIONS: FOLLOW-UP TO THE U.N.
CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR DEVELOPMENT AND U.S. PROGRAMS
FOR SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION ASSISTANCE (March 13, 1980) (A Con-
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tion plague U.S. foreign aid efforts in the area of information and
communications. Furthermore, in light of the current fiscal
restraints on government spending, the outlook for foreign aid to the
developing world for informatics in the near future is bleak.
Critics express further skepticism regarding the U.S. commit-
ment to United Nations' efforts in this area. For example, the LDCs
exerted substantial pressures to gain funding for improved scientific
and technical support at the 1979 United Nations Conference on Sci-
ence and Technology for Development.21 These pressures resulted
in the call for a world-wide scientific and technical information net-
work.22 While it was expected that the United States would con-
tribute fifty million dollars toward increased science and technology
assistance following the conference, the U.S. ultimately pledged
merely $7.2 million.23 Unless new approaches for assisting the
LDCs are found, the developing countries will have difficulty acquir-
ing the informatics technologies necessary for their economic, social,
and political development.
II
DEVELOPMENT OF BARRIERS TO
INFORMATION FLOW BY UNILATERAL
ACTION
A. REASONS FOR ERECTING BARRIERS
In some developing nations, information and communications
resources are extremely limited and governments generally have
paid little attention to associated policy issues. However, there is a
growing trend-particularly among the middle-tier developing
nations-to articulate national informatics policies, long range plans,
legal and regulatory environments, and to develop indigenous data
processsing and telecommunications industries. 24 In part, these
measures have led to the erection of barriers to the free flow of infor-
gressional Research Service-Science Policy Research Division document)) [hereinafter
cited as Information Assistance].
21. G. Knezo, Implementation of Recommendations Made at the United Nations
Conference on Science and Technology for Development 1-20 (March 13, 1980) (Part I
of U.S. POLICIES FOR THE DEVELOPING NATIONS: FOLLOW-UP TO THE U.N. CONFER-
ENCE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR DEVELOPMENT AND U.S. PROGRAMS FOR SCI-
ENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION ASSISTANCE (March 13, 1980) (a Congressional
Research Service-Science Policy Research Division document)).
22. For a discussion of the U.S. position on the LDC demands at this Conference, see
id at 20-57.
23. Broad, Fundfor U.N. Science Center Short by S200 Million, 208 SCIENCE 475
(1980).
24. In his opening address to the Intergovernmental Bureau for Informatics Confer-
ence on Transborder Data Flow Policies in Rome in June 1980, IBI Director General
F.A. Bernasconi noted that more than 60 LDCs have established informatics plans and
1981]
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mation.25 The LDCs view these barriers as necessary to protect vari-
ous economic, political, and social interests.
One reason for the development of informatics policies and the
erection of barriers to the flow of information is the preservation of
national sovereignty. 26 Information is a resource that yields eco-
nomic, political, and technological advantages. National sover-
eignty, in the context of information, refers to a country's desire to
control its own information resources and the advantages flowing
therefrom. Other countries' use of these resources threatens the
LDCs' national sovereignty by undermining this control.27
The threat is of particular concern to developing nations
because they lack the data processing and telecommunication tools
to fully exploit their information resources. For example, natural
resources, as compared to manufactured goods or service industries,
form the basis of many economies in the LDCs. They lack, however,
the facilities to process, store, and analyze natural resource data.
Consequently, the LDCs must utilize foreign data processing and
communications, services to perform the necessary information
processing functions, and then buy back the processed information
at a higher price.28 One commentator notes that "this cycle of trans-
border data flows is quite similar to cycles in other trade areas where
industrially less developed countries export raw materials (e.g., ores,
rubber, timber, oil) to industrialized countries and then purchase
back the more costly, finished products."2 9 In this way, LDCs are
deprived of the jobs that the processing of information creates.30
Control over information resources is undermined, and hence,
national sovereignty is threatened.
Another impetus for the erection of barriers is the LDCs' fear of
authorities. Bernasconi, Accepting the Challenge of New International Responsibilities, 3
TRANSNAT'L DATA REP. No. 3/4, at 3, 4 (1980).
25. HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 31.
26. For a discussion of national sovereignty as it is related to information flow, see
HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 20-21; Eger, The Global Phenomenon of Teleinformatics
An Introduction, 14 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 203, 231-34 (1981); Novotny, Transborder Data
Flows and International Law: A Framework for Policy-Oriented Inquiry, 16 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 141, 160-66 (1980).
27. A good example of such a threat is the developed nations' use of satellite remote
sensing. Data that are acquired via remote sensing are openly available. The LDCs
lack, however, the ability to interpret these data due to fei; technicians and limited com-
puter technology. In contrast, the developed countries and multinational corporations
often can afford both trained personnel and sophisticated equipment. Consequently,
LDCs fear that foreign nations and multinational enterprises will have a superior bar-
gaining position in negotiating contracts concerning natural resources. For a discussion
of remote sensing, see notes 92-96 infra and accompanying text.
28. See FREE FLOW, supra note 5, at 3-4.
29. Id at 4.
30. Id
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vulnerability.31 LDCs depend heavily on foreign firms for telecom-
munications and data processing equipment and services. Often,
critical economic and political data are stored entirely in computer
banks outside the country. The LDCs worry that the location of
these sensitive data abroad makes them vulnerable to disruptions
due to technical failures, manipulation, or even political sabotage. 32
In addition, they fear that the basis for important national decisions
is located extra-territorially.3 3 Finally, the LDCs fear that personal
information may be compromised if it is stored in a country with
lower standards of confidentiality. 34 Although developed nations
share these vulnerability concerns, the fear is often deeper for the
LDCs because of the high degree to which they are dependent upon
foreign nations for the performance of information-related
functions. 35
Another factor prompting the erection of barriers is the LDCs'
fear of cultural erosion.36 The foreign media provides an ongoing
flow of newsand entertainment programs to the LDCs. These pro-
grams introduce values and perspectives that often conflict with
those traditionally held in the LDC. Many LDCs view seriously the
threat that this inundation poses to the cultural identity of the
importing country. Developing countries likewise are concerned
that cultural erosion extends beyond media programming to all
forms of data flow that may reflect the institutions and traditions of
the producing country. The growing computerization of all types of
information accentuates the convergence of mass media and trans-
border data flow questions.37 Although shared by the developed
nations, this concern is of particular importance to the LDCs where
citizens have had limited exposure to foreign values, have high illit-
31. For a discussion of the vulnerability issue, see HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at
21-22; INTERGOVERNMENTAL BUREAU FOR INFORMATICS, ISSUES ON TRANSBORDER
DATA FLOW POLICIES 1-2 (Sept. 1979) [hereinafter referred to as DATA FLOW POLICIES];
Hamelink, supra note 5, at 147-48.
32. Id at 1; HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 21-22.
33. DATA FLOW POLICIES, supra note 31, at 1; Hamelink, supra note 5, at 147.
34. DATA FLOW POLICIES, supra note 31, at 2.
35. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 21.
36. For a discussion of the LDC's fear of cultural erosion from the foreign media and
the impact of this fear on informatics policies, see generally HOUSE REPORT, supra note
3, at 23; FREE FLOW, supra note 5, at 13-14; Masmoudi, The New World Information
Order, 29 J. CoM. 172 (1979); Righter, Battle ofthe Bias, 34 FOREIGN POL'Y 120 (1979);
Righter, he Political Challenge to the Western Press: Another 'en, Order"p, 35 WORLD
TODAY 167 (1979); Address by Joubert de Oliviera Brizida, Executive Secretary of the
Brazilian Special Secretariat of Informatics, 1980 Intergovernmental Bureau for
Informatics Conference on Transborder Data Flow Policies in Rome, Italy (June 23,
1980), reprinted in 3 TRANSNAT'L DATA REP. No. 3/4, at 32 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
BRAZILIAN ADDRESS].
37. Id at 33.
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eracy rates, and have few domestic information sources to use as
alternatives.
Finally, some LDCs have erected barriers to ptotect themselves
from over-dependency on foreign technology and information serv-
ices.38 The following section examines this situation.
B. BRAZIL: A CASE STUDY
Brazil is seen as a leader in the area of informatics policy devel-
opment and serves as a major Third World spokesman at interna-
tional meetings. The Brazilian informatics policy demonstrates how
LDCs can create a regulatory environment to achieve the objectives
discussed above. It also shows how LDCs can exert pressure on their
trading partners to accomplish these goals.
The Brazilian informatics policy is geared to the achievement of
several objectives including the development of domestic telecom-
munications and computer industries, and the regulation of trans-
border data flows in the interests of national sovereignty and
economic growth.39
The Brazilian government established the Coordinating Com-
mission on Data Processing Activities (CAPRE) in 1972 to oversee
the federal government's acquisition and use of computers 40 By
1975, Brazil's annual expenditures for data processing equipment
had skyrocketed to $275 million, nearly all of which consisted of
imports from foreign countries.41 Significant balance of trade defi-
38. See POLITICAL IMPACT, supra note 7, at 18-19.
39. Restrictions on information flow serve as devices to protect the national sover-
eignty, vulnerability, and cultural erosion concerns of the LDCs until their own
informatics technologies develop to the point at which the particular country becomes
less dependent upon the developed countries. "Protection is a needed tool to bridge the
dependence gap, and is to be removed gradually as indigenous capacity is able to face
exogenous competition." Saur, Infonnatis, New Technologies and Data Regulation: A
View From the Third World, 'in DATA REGULATION: EUROPEAN & THIRD WORLD
REALITIES 223, 224 (On Line 1978) [hereinafter cited as Third World View].
Executive Secretary Brizida of SEI summarized the major purposes behind the Brazil-
ian plan:
The aim of such control is not to restrain the information flow but rather to
give commercial reciprocity to the exchange of information among countries. It
concerns the use of data banks, software, data processing capability and other
facilities. In terms of strategy, it is fundamental that a country have control over
the information resources essential to its sovereignty and development. Thus,
the international commerce of information products and services must be sub-
mitted to conditions related to their content.
BRAZILIAN ADDRESS, supra note 36, at 33-34. See also Brizida, The Brazilian Trans-
border Data Flow Policy, 4 TRANSNAT'L DATA REP. No. 3, at 19 (1981).
40. M. Ripper & J. Wanderley, The Brazilian Computer and Communications Regu-
latory Environment and Transborder Data Flow Policy 3 (June 1980) (unpublished
paper presented at the Intergovernmental Bureau for Informatics World Conference on
Transborder Data Flow Policies) [hereinafter cited as Brazilian Policy].
41. Id
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cits resulted.4 2 The growing awareness of the importance of com-
puter technology to the successes of national development policies
and to the solution of the Brazilian balance of trade problem
prompted the Brazilian government, in 1976, to enlarge CAPRE's
scope of responsibility.43 Instead of merely overseeing the govern-
ments' acquisition and use of computers, CAPRE became responsi-
ble for the supervision of private users' acquisition and use of
computers.44 CAPRE approval was a prerequisite to the importation
of computer parts.45 In addition, CAPRE received the power to
establish a total quota of computer parts that could be imported.
Finally, CAPRE became responsible for proposing a national
informatics policy.46
CAPRE examined applications for the import of computer
equipment on a case-by-case basis. CAPRE delineated the criteria
for implementing the import quota by assigning priority to projects
with high nationalization content, high exporting potential, high
technological absorption capacity or total technology transfer in the
case of joint ventures, favorable market share implications, and con-
trolling capital in the hands of Brazilians.47 Domestic manufacturers
were encouraged to manufacture computer equipment; those using
their own technology would receive priority treatment when imple-
menting the import quota.4 8 Above all, no foreign computers could
be used "which through teleinformatics accomplish tasks whose
solution can be obtained in the country. '49 Through such means of
regulating imports, Brazil sought to protect its nascent computer
industry. 0
In 1979, the BraZilian Government established the Special
Informatics Agency (SEI) to replace CAPRE.5 1 The SEI is part of
the National Security Council and acts as an advisory body to the
President.5 2 SEI's responsibilities are greater than those of CAPRE.
SEI proposes the national informatics plan and is responsible for its
42. Third World View, supra note 39, at 232.
43. Brazilian Policy, supra note 40, at 4.
44. Id
45. The criteria CAPRE delineated for determining whether they would approve the
import of a particular computer part are set forth in text accompanying note 47 infra.
46. Id
47. Id
48. .d
49. BRAZILIAN ADDRESS, .supra note 36, at 33.
50. Brazil- regulates-the importation of computer parts as part of its strategy to-man-
age its balance of payments problem. A government council limited imports of computer
parts to 130 million U.S. dollars in 1978. Economists conservatively estimate that with-
out CAPRE regulation, 1978 imports would have exceeded 300 million U.S. dollars.
Third World View, supra note 39, at 233.
51. BRAZILIAN ADDRESS, supra note 36, at 32.
52. Id
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execution. SEI oversees all aspects of the manufacture and use of
electronic components. Finally, and of key importance, SEI regu-
lates all transborder data flows from other countries.53
SEI examines potential transborder data flows and international
information services on an individual basis. 54 SEI then determines
what the impact of the services will be in terms of economic, privacy,
and national sovereignty concerns.55 Based upon this analysis, the
application is either accepted, rejected, or conditionally accepted.56
These data controls are not designed solely for the computer
and communications industries. International operations of all
kinds, especially in the service sector, require information flows.
The role that information plays in supporting industries such as
banking and insurance is unquestioned and is receiving increased
attention in Brazil. The Brazilian transborder data flow policy
applies equally to all types of information that are considered com-
mercial products with corresponding economic value.57
Most recently, Brazil has proposed the employment of "gate-
ways" for channeling information as a means for systematizing data
traffic into and lut of the country.58 The establishment of such a
communications mode would increase government control and pro-
vide more effective means for tariffing information flows.59
C. EFFECTS OF BARRIERS ON MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
Transborder data flow regulations have significant conse-
quences for multinational enterprises either operating or attempting
to enter markets in the developing world. Focusing on the Brazilian
regulations, these consequences become readily apparent. 60 Mul-
tinational corporations first encounter barriers at the application
stage.61 Processing applications for the sale or purchase of informa-
tion products and services can be time-consuming and costly. Appli-
cation and inspection requirements may compromise proprietary
information. For example, the Brazil application requires the appli-
cant to provide information about the company, the services being
53. Brazilian Policy, supra note 40, at 5.
54. Brizida, The Brazilian Transborder Data Flow Policy, 4 TRANSNAT'L DATA REP.
No. 3, at 19, 19-21 (1981).
55. Id
56. Id
57. BRAZILIAN ADDRESS, supra note 36, at 34.
58. Id
59. Id
60. A compendium of letters from multinational enterprises commenting on barriers
to international data flow can be found in International Data Rom Hearings Before a
Subcommittee of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. app.
3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
61. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
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provided, and the resources needed for implementing those services.
Furthermore, the company must report its objectives for making the
transfer.62 Clearly, much of this information may otherwise be
confidential.
Brazil does not allow the importation of information services if
the service could be provided domestically.6 3 A multinational cor-
poration desiring to operate in Brazil, therefore, may be forced to
establish duplicate data processing facilities in Brazil rather than
receive services or equipment directly from abroad.' Consequently,
the cost of doing business may drastically increase. Furthermore,
the unavailability of adequate equipment and services produced in
Brazil may lead to less efficient operations. In order to avoid the
increases in costs or requirements to provide proprietary informa-
tion, many enterprises may revert to less effective means of commu-
nicating world-wide. Finally, the increase in cost and decrease in
efficiency may simply preclude an enterprise from entering a market
such as Brazil.64
It is too early to determine the full impact of Brazil's regulatory
structure on multinational corporations. Likewise, the effect of these
protectionist measures on Brazilian economic growth is uncertain.
However, the establishment of similar regulatory frameworks in
other developing countries could have significant repercussions for
businesses attempting to expand their operations into the developing
world. While existing LDC markets are small compared with those
of the industrialized countries, the opportunity for growth is substan-
tial.66 At present, multinational firms face numerous difficulties
when dealing with developing countries and often consider these
endeavors risky.67 Increased regulation may further inhibit multina-
tional enterprises from exploring the potential of emerging markets
in the developing world.
62. Brazilian Policy, supra note 40, at 6.
63. BRAZILIAN ADDRESS, supra note 36, at 33.
64. Hearings, supra note 60, at 739.
65. For a general discussion of the impact of barriers to the flow of information, see
HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 23-27 and Hearings, supra note 60, at 139.
66. ARTHUR D. LITTLE, WORLD TELECOMMUNICATIONS STUDY II: 1980-1990
(1980); Szuprowicz, The World's Top 50 Computer Import Markets, DATAMATION 141
(1981).
67. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, TRADE ISSUES IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND
INFORMATION: PROMOTING U.S. TRADE IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION
PRODUCTS WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (NTIA Report 81-72, 1981).
1981]
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III
LDCs IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENAS
In addition to unilaterally developing national information poli-
cies, the LDCs have emerged as a significant coalition at interna-
tional meetings where unified expressions of their common concerns
have made a significant impact on the resolution of conflicts, the
development of new international agreements and codes of conduct,
and the setting of future agendas. A demand for the creation of a
"new world information order" (NWIO) accompanies their call for a
"new world economic order" at these meetings.6 8 One commentator
defines the NWIO as the "international exchange of information in
which nations, which develop their cultural system in an autono-
mous way and with complete sovereign control of resources, fully
and effectively participate as independent members of the interna-
tional community." 69 In other words, under the NWIO, the LDCs
would have equal access to the world's store of knowledge and other
information resources and would control foreign media reporting
from their countries. 70
Debates on ihe need for a NWIO have been ongoing in several
international arenas, 7' although the United Nations remains the key
forum for these discussions. Though the NWIO debates often center
on concerns of cultural imperialism and freedom of the press,72 these
issues are only part of the larger spectrum of information flow issues
reflecting more general economic and social goals of the LDCs. The
NWIO promotes these broader concerns by emphasizing the need to
achieve a balance between developed and developing nations that
will enable the LDCs to become active participants in the world
68. For a discussion of the LDCs' demands for a New World Information Order, see
generally NWIO Debate, note 18 supra, Dizard, The U.S. Position: DBS and Free Flow.
30 J. COM. 157 (1980); Hamelink, note 5 supra; Masmoudi, note 36 supra; Righter, Battle
of the Bias, 34 FOREIGN POL'Y 120 (1979); Righter, The Political Challenge to the Western
Press. 4nother "New Order" 33 WORLD TODAY 167 (1979); C. Hamelink, The New
International Information Order Development and Obstacles (Occasional Paper 80/2 of
the Vienna Institute for Development [hereinafter cited as Development and Obstacles].
69. Hamelink, supra note 5, at 146.
70. One key LDC proponent of the NWIO defines it in the following manner
The new world information order founded on democratic principles seeks to
establish relations of equality in the communications field between developed
and developing nations and aims at greater justice and greater balance. Far
from calling in question the freedom of information, it proposes to ensure that
this principle is applied fairly and equitably for all nations and not only in the
case of the more developed among them ....
Masmoudi, supra note 36, at 178.
71. For a chronology of meetings at which the need for an NWIO was debated, see
generally Development and Obstacles, note 68 supra.
72. See notes 36-37 supra and accompanying text; see also note 68 supra and accom-
panying text.
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marketplace and partners in an increasingly interdependent world.
The LDCs view this balance not simply in terms of the news media,
but equally in terms of access to scientific and technical information,
telecommunications facilities, and the distribution of the frequency
spectrum.
Achieving that balance requires limiting information flows in
some circumstances while encouraging them in others. Culturally
biased information originating from the industrialized nations and
broadcast to the developing world is often considered anathema,
while vital technical data is highly sought after. In sum, the NWIO,
like many LDC national informatics policies, requires placing some
degree of control on information flows. This section discusses sev-
eral international organizations and proposals through which
nations have multilaterally attempted to address NWIO demands.
A. UNITED NATIONS
The United Nations Economic, Social, and Cultural Organiza-
tion (UNESCO) is the primary forum for debate on the mass media
issues.73 These issues result from a clash between two competing
perspectives. The 1946 United Nations Declaration on Freedom of
Information provides that "all states should proclaim policies under
which the free flow of information within countries and across fron-
tiers will be protected." 74 Two years later, the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights added further support to the "free flow" concept
by providing that "everyone has a right to freedom of opinion and
expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions. . . to seek,
receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and
regardless of frontiers."75
The LDCs have continually sought to alter these principles.
They fear that the unrestricted flow of information will lead to cul-
tural domination by the western mass media.76 Moreover, at numer-
ous UNESCO meetings the Soviet Union has sought greater controls
over the press. For example, at the 1976 UNESCO General Assem-
bly the Soviet Union introduced a draft Declaration on Mass Media,
73. For a discussion of the mass media issues, see generally A. SMITH, THE GEOPOL-
ICS OF INFORMATION (1980); Masmoudi, note 36 supra; Righter, Battle of the Bias, 34
FOREIGN POL'Y 120 (1979); Righter, The Political Challenge to the Western Press:
Another "New Order";" 35 WORLD TODAY 167 (1979).
74. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 59(I), Sixty-fifth Plenary Meeting,
14 December 1949, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS, SERIES I, GENERAL
ASSEMBLY 1946-48 (D. Djonovich ed. 1972).
75. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) U.N. Doc. A/810, at
71, art. 19 (1948).
76. See notes 36-37 supra and accompanying text.
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expressing the need for state control over the press.77 This draft
became the subject of intense controversy at UNESCO. In an effort
to avoid further dissension, the proponents substantially revised the
draft and presented it at the 1978 General Assembly. 78 While the
revised draft affirmed basic human rights and maintained the free-
dom of journalists, it also asserted the need for a new, more just and
effective information and communication order, intended to
strengthen international peace and understanding and based on a
"free flow and a wider and better balanced dissemination of infor-
mation."79 This compromise failed to settle the debate over the free
flow of information; it merely restated the issue that remains a rally-
ing point for the LDCs and a major concern to Western journalists.8 0
In 1977, UNESCO established the International Commission
for the Study of Communications Problems."' UNESCO hoped that
the Commission would resolve the mass media debates and provide
a comprehensive and independent view of the future role of commu-
nications. Rather than calming the debate, the Commission's final
report, the "MacBride Report,"82 renewed the controversy by raising
some disturbing, questions about the relationship between modern
telecommunications and information technologies and the produc-
tion and delivery of mass media programming.
The MacBride Report offers over eighty recommendations for
implementing its objectives.8 3 Although asserting fundamental prin-
ciples of freedom of the press, sa the report supports many LDC con-
cerns affecting electronic international information flows such as
"differential communications pricing policies,"85 "international
77. See NWIO Debate, supra note 18, at 17-24, for a discussion of relevant United
Nations Documents.
78. Declaration on Fundamental Principles Concerning the Contribution of the
Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and International Understanding, to the Promotion
of Human Rights and to Countering Racialism, Apartheid and Incitement to War, Reso-
lution 4/9.3/2 adopted by the General Conference at its twentieth session, I RECORDS OF
THE GENERAL CONFERENCE, TWENTIETH SESSION, PARIS, 24 OCTOBER TO 28 NOVEM-
BER 1978 (Resolutions) 100-04 (UNESCO).
79. Id art. I, at 102.
80. At a May 1981 Conference, representatives of free press organizations issued a
formal declaration "Declaration of Talloires" opposing Third World and Soviet efforts
in UNESCO to adopt principles regulating the media. In addition, several Congressmen
introduced resolutions in the 97th Congress opposing UNESCO efforts to restrict free-
dom of the press. H.R. Res. 142,97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H2328 (daily ed.
May 19, 1981) (Mr. Shamansky); H.R. Con. Res. 137, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG.
REc. H2328 (daily ed. May 19, 1981) (Mr. Stark).
81. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS,
MANY VOICES, ONE WORLD 295 (1980).
82. Id
83. Id at 253-72.
84. Id at 233.
85. Id at 257.
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action to alter telecommunication tariffs that militate against
small and peripheral users," 86 and more equitable sharing of the
electro-magnetic spectrum and the geostationary orbit "as the com-
mon property of mankind."87 In sum, the MacBride Report suggests
a panoply of changes to existing international regulations and agree-
ments, and proposes the formulation of new legal tools to ensure
more equitable access to and use of modern information and com-
munications technology in the developing world.88
The MacBride Report was the subject of considerable debate at
UNESCO's Twenty-first General Conference in Belgrade in October
1980. Ultimately, the Conference passed a resolution that com-
mends the MacBride Report, but refused to endorse its recommen-
dations.8 9 Significantly, the Conference created an International
Program for Development of Communications (IPDC).90 The
IPDC, operating as a separate entity within UNESCO, is designed to
improve information infrastructures and train personnel in the
LDCs.91 Although the IPDC provides a new opportunity to
strengthen LDC communications capabilities through a cooperative
effort between the developed and developing world, observers fear
that the LDCs may use the IPDC as a vehicle for espousing their
views on the Western mass media's cultural domination. Lack of
funding may similarly hinder the operation of the IPDC.
The United Nations has also served as a forum for dispute over
the controversial areas of remote sensing and direct broadcasting
from satellites. 92 Satellite remote sensing can provide extensive
information on natural resource deposits located within the LDCs. 93
Developing countries can use this information for more effective
planning and utilization of these resources. The LDCs, however,
motivated by national sovereignty concerns, fear that the remotely
sensed natural resources data that foreign governments and multina-
tional corporations acquire could be used against them.94 Presently,
86. Id
87. Id at 258.
88. For a presentation of different perspectives on the MacBride Report, see COM-
MUNICATION IN THE EIGHTIEs: A READER ON THE "McBRIDE REPORT" (C. Hamelink
ed. 1980).
89. Belgrade 1980: Breakdown or Breakthrough, 1 CHRON. INT'L COM. 2 (1980).
90. id; Special Political Comm.: Questions Relating to Information, 35 U.N.
GAOR, Annex (unedited Agenda Item 59) (Dec. 1980).
91. Id
92. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) has also served as a forum
for dispute on the issues direct broadcasting raises. For a discussion of United Nations
and ITU debates on these issues, see generally Dizard, note 68 supra.
93. See notes 26-30 supra and accompanying text.
94. For example, remote sensing technology has been used to "track the desert locust
in the Sahara, to map largely unknown regions of Brazil, to inventory forest land in
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there are no restrictions on the dissemination of data obtained
through remote sensing. The LDCs propose to restrict the distribu-
tion of these data and to condition the allowance of remote sensing
upon the receipt of prior consent from the target country.95 Like-
wise, fears of cultural erosion have prompted the LDCs to insist
upon agreements prohibiting direct broadcasting from satellites
unless the broadcaster receives prior consent from the receiving
nation's government.96 The United Nations Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space has held numerous debates on these
issues, but has been unable to successfully resolve them.97
Another United Nations agency that is currently addressing the
issue of transborder data flow is the United Nations Commission on
Transnational Corporations. Slated as an agenda item for the Com-
mission's September 1981 meeting is a recently prepared report by
the United Nations Centre for Transnational Corporations entitled
"Strengthening the Negotiating Capacity of Developing Coun-
tries."98 The two-part report examines the role and impact of trans-
national corporations in transborder data flows and provides an
overview of the. economic, political, social, and legal implications of
transborder data flows for developing countries.99 These activities
reflect the growing number of agencies within the United Nations
system that are studying various aspects of the international data
flow question and may be forums where new agreements regarding
these issues are proposed.
B. INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNION
The International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the oldest
international organization, is an acknowledged arena for the devel-
opment of regulations and standards for international telecommuni-
Thailand, to search for iron ore in Egypt, and to determine land use and land capability
in Tanzania:' Information Assistance, supra note 20, at 115-16.
95. SUBCOMM. ON SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS OF THE HousE COMM. ON
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, WORLD-WIDE SPACE AcTVTIEs, H.R. Doc. No. 352, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 471 (1977).
96. The "prior consent" issues revolve around whether transmitting and receiving
countries should obtain a priori agreement. The Soviet Union and many developing
countries favor this approach. The United States maintains that such regulations are
premature. A compromise approach favors prior consent on the transmissions from
satellites unrelated to content. See Dizard, supra note 68, at 162, for a discussion of these
different viewpoints.
97. See generally NWIO Debate, supra note 18, at 19-24.
98. Commission on Transnational Corporations, Transnational Corporations and
Transborder Data Flows: An Overview, 7 U.N. GAOR (Provisional Agenda, Item 8),
U.N. Doc. E/C.10/87 (1981).
99. Id
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cations.1°° The ITU employs a consultative process to ensure that
national telecommunications systems can connect with each other.101
Its pronouncements have a critical impact upon the international
flow of data. Of its current membership of 154 nations, over one
hundred members are LDCs. The ITU operates on the basis of a
single vote for each member country. Consequently, the LDCs,
through collective support, can substantially influence the outcome
of ITU deliberations.
The ITU sponsors the World Administrative Radio Conference
(WARC), which reviews and revises international regulations con-
cerning frequency allocations within the electromagnetic spectrum.
Traditionally, frequencies have been allocated on a "first come-first
served" basis that favors the industrialized nations that presently
have substantial communications equipment. According to some
estimates ten percent of the world's population presently controls
ninety percent of the spectrum. The LDCs insist that the first come-
first served principle be abandoned in favor of a priori planning to
ensure that an adequate number of frequencies and orbital slots will
be available for LDC use at a time when they have acquired more
sophisticated communications technologies.10 2 The United States'
position is that the developing countries need not be concerned
because improvements in technology will permit expanded use of the -
spectrum by the time the LDCs require it and a priori planning will
only inhibit useful technological advances. 10 3
Many observers anticipated that the most recent WARC confer-
ence, held in 1979,'0 would erupt into a political debate between
developed and developing countries on frequency allocation issues.
Although several areas of dispute emerged, the debate never took
place at the Conference. There are several possible explanations for
this. One participant emphasized that although the developing
nations constituted seventy-two percent of the voting delegation,
they constituted only fifty-one percent of the total number of dele-
100. The International Telegraph Union, founded in 1865, merged with the Interna-
tional Radiotelegraph Union to become the International Telecommunications Union in
1934. For a concise presentation of the operations of the ITU, see O'Neill, The Interna-
tional Telecommunication Union, 1981 TELECOM. 25.
101. The two consultative committees are the International Radio Consultative Com-
mittee (CCIR) and the nternational Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee
(CCITT). Through a number of study groups, the CCITT recommends communications
tariffs, technical standards, and operating protocols. Although adherence to CCITT rec-
ommendations is voluntary, these recommendations are generally accepted by govern-
ments and industries alike.
102. Hearings, supra note 60, at 819.
103. Id
104. The World.Administrative Radio Conference of 1979: U.S. Preparatins and Pros-
pects, reprinted in 125 CONG. Rtc. S9312 (daily ed. July 12, 1979).
1981]
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gates at the Conference.105 Because of the way the Conference per-
formed its work in committees and subcommittees, many of the
developing nations did not have enough delegates to be represented
on each subcommittee.10 6 Consequently, "subcommittee and work-
ing group meetings were dominated by the developed nations."10 7
Another reason for the lack of outright confrontation is the fact
that the 1979 Conference postponed major frequency and orbital slot
allocation issues for future regional and specialized WARC Confer-
ences to be held over the next several years. It is at these meetings,
in addition to the 1982 Plenipotentiary Conference of the ITU, that
the industrialized nations will face the LDCs' growing pressure for
increased access to the spectrum and for more funding for technical
assistance programs.108 The fact that several of these meetings were
scheduled despite opposition from countries like the United States
reflects the LDCs influence at the 1979 WARC.109 As a result, the
real strength of the LDCs in the ITU may not be tested until these
meetings are held.
C. INTERGOVERNMENTAL BUREAU FOR INFORMATICS
The purpose of the Intergovernmental Bureau for Informatics
(IBI), an international organization consisting of forty members, is to
provide assistance to developing countries in the application of
information and communications technologies. In addition, IBI pro-
vides a forum for the developing nations to promote new informatics
policies for the LDCs and to discuss the economic, social, and legal
effects of the new informatics technologies.' 10 Given the politiciza-
tion of UNESCO and the limited scope of the ITU, the IBI may offer
an alternative forum for balancing the interests of developed and
developing countries on informatics and transborder data flow
problems. Currently, however, few developed countries are mem-
bers of the IBIYl
105. Honig, Lessons for the 1999 WARC, 30 J. COM. 48 (1980).
106. Id
107. Id
108. Id at 48.
109. Hearings, supra note 60, at 807; ACADEMY FOR EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,
RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR WARC 79 FOR DEVELOPMENT COMMUNICATIONS: A
REPORT TO USAID (Feb. 1980); N. Bowie, Third World Countries at WARC: Positions
and Achievements (unpublished paper presented at Conference on World Communica-
tions: Decisions for the Eighties, Annenberg School of Communications, University of
Pennsylvania, May 13, 1980).
110. The IBI was established under the auspices of the United Nations and UNESCO
by Resolutions 22(111) of 3 October 1946, 160(VIII) of 10 August 1948, 318(XI) of 14
August 1950, and 340(XIII) of 24 August 1951, by the Economic and Social Council of
the United Nations, and Resolution 2.24 by the General Conference at UNESCO.
111. Crawford, "he IBI Transborder Data Flow Conference: An American View, 3
TRANSNAT'L DATA REP. No. 3/4, at 38 (1980).
DEVELOPING WORLD PERSPECTIVE
The IBI sponsors conferences on a regional and international
level to debate informatics issues. In August 1979, the IBI and
UNESCO co-sponsored the Intergovernmental Conference on Strat-
egy and Policies in Informatics (SPIN), emphasizing the need for
LDCs to reduce dependence on foreign technology and develop
indigenous informatics capabilities. In June 1980, the IBI sponsored
a Conference on Transborder Data Flow Policies. The IBI, at this
conference, promoted LDC interests by proposing "to consider
whether and in what ways government regulatory policies need to be
reorganized,"1 2 to explore the possibility of "introducing a registry
or licensing system,"'1 3 to investigate the need to revise "traditional
legal approaches to the protection of intellectual property,""14 "to
evaluate whether any new laws may be needed . . . in terms of
ownership rights, liability and misuse," I"5 "to examine. . . jurisdic-
tion over multinational corporations,"" 6 "to clarify the concept of
national sovereignty,"1 7 to "define the scope of the principle of the
free flow of information,"" 8 and to "explore . ..preparation of
international agreements."'1 9
Although the Conference did not adopt any resolutions, it did
establish two international working parties. One is charged with
studying data protection and international law and the other is
charged with studying the economic dimensions of transborder data
flow.' 2 0 The recommendations of these study groups will be the sub-
ject of discussion at IBI meetings to be held throughout various
regions of the world and will ultimately be submitted to the second
SPIN Conference scheduled for 1983.121 Through these conferences
and proposals the role of the IBI in shaping international communi-
cations and information policy will continue to expand and may pro-
vide a major forum for debating new agreements governing
international information flow.
D. IMPACT OF LDCs IN INTERNATIONAL ARENAS
The LDCs view international organizations, multilateral agree-
ments, and international codes of conduct as effective tools to
112. DATA FLOW POLICIES, supra note 31, at 11.
113. Id
114. Id at 6.
115. Id at8.
116. Id at 12.
117. Id at 14.
118. Id
119. Id at 15.
120. Rules to Facilitate TDFEnvisioned, 4 TRANSNAT'L DATA REP. No. 3, at 26 (1981)
interview with Prof. F.A. Bemasconi, Director General, IBI.
121. Id
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improve access to information resources and communications tech-
nologies.122 For example, the LDCs can employ international codes
of conduct to exert some degree of control over international com-
merce. 123 Codes of conduct, however, can be a double-edged sword.
On one hand, they provide a means for harmonizing divergent
national policies and for protecting the LDCs from economic, social,
and political exploitation. On the other hand, they can restrict inter-
national commerce that, in general, benefits both developed and
developing countries. Hence, both LDCs and developed countries
have a substantial stake in carefully drafting international agree-
ments so that the benefits to the LDCs outweigh the costs to interna-
tional commerce in general.
International arenas provide a major framework for the debate
and resolution of international telecommunications and information
questions. Although many of the specific problems addressed at
these organizations are technical in nature, the debate often takes on
significant political dimensions. Because of their large numbers and
their increased awareness of information-related problems, the
LDCs, throughinternational organizations, are taking an expanded
role in determining transborder data flow policies. At the same time,
the developed countries are beginning to recognize the need to
respond to LDC concerns at international meetings with substantive
strategies for international cooperation.
CONCLUSION
There has been an increasing awareness of the information-
related problems and concerns of the LDCs in recent years. These
countries have taken significant measures, both unilaterally and col-
lectively in international fora, to solve these problems and to estab-
lish a new world information order. Many LDCs have adopted
national informatics policies in an effort to develop their own infor-
mation capabilities. In part, these policies have involved the erection
122. As one observer has noted:
In recent years, and especially since the United Nations adopted the New
International Economic Order ... the LDCs in particular have pressed for the
creation of international organizations to enforce new multinational agree-
ments.... International bodies may be empowered with the authority to rap
the knuckles of companies acting outside international agreements. Interna-
tional organizations may also be authorized to interpret agreements through
some system of adminstration and review. They may further provide for settle-
ment of disputes through conciliation, arbitration, or even adjudication. Codes
of conduct would continue and even reinforce this kind of international inter-
vention.
R. WALDMANN, REGULATING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS THROUGH CODES OF CON-
DUCT 13 (1980).
123. Id
DEVELOPING WORLD PERSPECTIVE
of barriers to the free flow of information. What they represent is
the LDCs' attempt to harness the benefits of modem technology
without increasing their dependence on the industrialized world.
The developed nations are stakeholders in the success of the
LDCs' quest for informatics development. Barriers to the flow of
information infringe upon the ability of multinational enterprises to
compete in international markets. Ultimately, such barriers may
preclude some businesses from operating in certain developing coun-
tries. Finally, the barriers can seriously impair fundamental free-
doms. To avoid these consequences, the industrialized countries
must become more sensitive to LDC concerns and must begin to
develop policies for dealing with their demands.
Simply providing additional funding will not solve the problem.
The developing countries need assistance in establishing training
programs and initiating local development efforts. In doing so, the
developed countries must appreciate the legitimate LDC concerns
regarding national sovereignty and cultural integrity. At the same
time, the Western World must emphasize the importance of funda-
mental principles such as freedom of the press and demonstrate how
modern technology can benefit, rather than harm, the interests of the
developing world.
Because the world has become increasingly interdependent as a
result of modern information and communications technology, new
rules governing those technologies may be required. The developing
nations are determined to become major players in these delibera-
tions and will use their collective strength to support their positions.
The developed nations also have a major stake in information and
communications development in the LDCs. Failure to achieve
cooperation on these issues would be detrimental to all nations.
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